

Policy Brief

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
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Khamenei's Funeral as a Geopolitical Roll Call:

The Emerging Middle East–Eurasia Order

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Key Judgments

- **Khamenei's funeral reveals a network, not a bloc.** Participating states include strategic partners, mediators, corridor actors, hedgers, and autonomous powers rather than members of a unified coalition.
- **The funeral activates two overlapping systems of authority that generate three analytically distinct maps: state diplomacy, religious authority, and state–wider response divergence.**
- **The gap between expected and actual participation is more revealing than attendance alone.** Withdrawal, downgrade, and expanded participation can expose political risk, strategic autonomy, external pressure, and changing calculations.
- **Reports of a U.S. pressure campaign, though not independently corroborated, suggest that the attendance pattern observed by the cutoff may have been contested rather than simply observed.**
- **Pakistan stands out as a cross-system bridge node linking Iran, the United States, the Gulf, South Asia, and Eurasia.**
- **The emerging order is defined by partial alignment, strategic connectivity, and contested autonomy—not by a new bipolar divide.**

Executive Summary

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's funeral is functioning as a geopolitical roll call of the emerging Middle East–Eurasia order.

Khamenei embodied two overlapping forms of authority: supreme political authority within the Islamic Republic and transnational religious-political influence beyond the Iranian state. His death therefore generated two intersecting systems of authority and three analytically distinct maps: state diplomacy, religious authority, and state–wider response divergence.

The attendance pattern points to a network rather than a bloc. China and Russia sent senior but non-head-of-state representatives, a pattern consistent with calibrated support. Pakistan appeared as a major bridge node. India's representation can be read as combining recognition with strategic restraint. Central Asian and South Caucasus participation was consistent with Iran's growing relevance to north–south connectivity. China sent a senior national legislator, Russia a presidential special envoy, India a deputy foreign minister and a state governor, while several senior Central Asian representatives appeared at the Tehran ceremonies.

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The most revealing signals, however, lie in the gap between expectation and reality. Absence, downgraded representation, and unexpected or expanded participation can reveal political risk and strategic autonomy more clearly than attendance alone.

Reports further allege that Washington pressured governments to stay away. The claim had not been independently corroborated as of the analytical cutoff. If external pressure shaped participation, the funeral cannot be read as a neutral snapshot of international preferences. The allegation originated in Iranian media reporting based on an unnamed source rather than an independently released U.S. document.

The broader implication is clear: the funeral is not revealing a new alliance. It is revealing a network of relationships, dependencies, autonomies, and pressures—and the struggle over who could attend, who would attend, and who was willing to bear the political cost of attendance became part of the emerging order itself.

Why This Matters

The U.S.–Israel–Iran war did not produce a simple transition from military superiority to political settlement. U.S. battlefield advantages did not translate automatically into settlement control. Their political conversion was constrained by cumulative costs, Hormuz leverage, nuclear bargaining, alliance divergence, and the absence of credible enforcement. The conflict instead fragmented into three tracks: U.S.–Iran termination, Iran–Israel deterrence, and U.S.–Israel alliance management (Wu, 2026a, 2026d).

Khamenei’s funeral is one of the first major international events to expose this emerging environment. Iran has strong incentives to convert survival into visible international recognition. Washington, if reports of a pressure campaign prove even partly accurate, may seek to prevent Tehran from turning survival and negotiated de-escalation into diplomatic prestige (Tasnim News Agency, 2026).

The funeral therefore marks a shift from wartime coercion toward post-conflict legitimacy competition. It is not merely a ceremony, but a struggle over the political meaning of the war and over Iran’s place in the emerging order.

Methodological Note

This brief treats funeral participation as a sequence rather than a binary outcome. It distinguishes among attendance, representative level, delegation composition, unexpected absence, downgraded participation, and previously unannounced or expanded participation.

It also separates verified facts, reported expectations, and unverified claims. Reports allege that Washington pressured governments to stay away, but the claim had not been independently corroborated as of the analytical cutoff (Tasnim News Agency, 2026).

The analysis distinguishes among three related but non-equivalent dimensions: state-diplomatic participation, clerical or religious-institutional response, and wider religious, movement, civic, or popular reaction. These dimensions are then compared to identify state-wider response divergence. Here, divergence denotes a difference in publicly identified state and wider-response evidence; it does not establish opposition between a government and its society.

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Country coding is based on publicly identified country-level participation or response by the analytical cutoff. State-diplomatic participation requires an identified government, parliamentary, military, or officially designated representative. Clerical, religious, civic, movement, cultural, political-social, and popular responses are coded separately. Multiple appearances by the same country are counted once within each analytical map.

1. One Funeral, Two Systems of Authority

Khamenei's authority operated through two overlapping systems: supreme political authority within the Iranian state and transnational religious-political authority beyond it.

Politically, he stood at the center of Iran's state, military, security, nuclear, and regional architecture. His death therefore generated a **State-Diplomatic Map** defined by attendance, representative level, delegation composition, and political risk.

Religiously, his influence extended beyond the Iranian state but operated within a decentralized Shia system. Qom and Najaf represent different traditions of clerical authority, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's response should not be read as simple pro-Iran alignment. Sistani publicly mourned Khamenei and acknowledged his long-standing role in leading the Islamic Republic, but such religious recognition does not itself establish political subordination to Tehran (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2026).

External attack can compress internal differences without eliminating them. Solidarity is not subordination. Mourning is not political alignment. Religious recognition is not acceptance of Iran's state model. Reuters reporting from the Tehran ceremonies similarly found that some participants distinguished cultural, religious, or personal mourning from support for the political system (Reuters, 2026a).

The wider Islamic response also extends beyond the Shia clerical system to Sunni-majority governments, political and armed movements, and Muslim publics. These actors respond through different combinations of religion, strategy, domestic politics, and opposition to external intervention. Public reporting identified religious leaders from Russia, India, China, Türkiye, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, and Bangladesh, alongside scholars and intellectuals from Indonesia and Afghanistan (Islamic Republic News Agency [IRNA], 2026a, 2026d).

These two systems of authority therefore generate three analytically distinct maps: **state diplomacy, religious authority, and state-wider response divergence**.

2. The Geopolitical Roll Call: Route, Attendance, Absence, and Pressure

The planned multi-stage funeral route itself carries political meaning:

Tehran → Qom → Najaf → Karbala → Mashhad

The route was scheduled to extend from Tehran and Qom to ceremonies in Najaf and Karbala before final burial in Mashhad (IRNA, 2026f; Reuters, 2026c, 2026d).

Tehran represents state sovereignty; Qom, Iran's clerical system; Najaf, transnational Shia authority; Karbala, martyrdom and resistance; and Mashhad, Iran's national sacred geography.

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Taken as a planned sequence, the route functions as a process of posthumous legitimacy reconstruction.

Foreign participation reveals a network rather than a bloc. China and Russia offered calibrated support without alliance commitment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2026; IRNA, 2026c). Pakistan stood out as a cross-system bridge linking Iran, the United States, the Gulf, South Asia, and Eurasia. Its bridge-node role derives not from ideological alignment but from simultaneous access across otherwise only partially connected political, military, Gulf, Iranian, South Asian, and Eurasian networks. Its representation extended across political, military, and internal-security institutions (Anadolu Agency, 2026; IRNA, 2026b, 2026h). India's representation can be read as combining recognition with strategic restraint (Reuters, 2026b). Central Asian and South Caucasus participation can be read as reflecting the growing importance of north-south connectivity, while Afghanistan illustrated how practical interdependence can persist despite ideological difference (IRNA, 2026e, 2026i; Wu, 2026b, 2026c).

Strategic connectivity can deepen without ideological convergence or formal alliance. As **Figure 1** shows, the state-diplomatic pattern was geographically broad but politically heterogeneous. Iran's Foreign Ministry announced that representatives from 100 countries were expected to attend, while subsequent Iranian reporting described participation from nearly 100 countries across official, political, religious, and civil-society categories (IRNA, 2026e, 2026g). Figure 1 therefore maps only the publicly identifiable state-diplomatic subset.




Figure 1. State-Diplomatic Participation

Publicly identified state-diplomatic participation in Khamenei's funeral ceremonies, as of July 6, 2026, 12:00 ET.

Note: Green indicates publicly identified state-diplomatic participation; red indicates publicly identified unexpected or expanded participation; blue indicates publicly identified country-specific absence or downgrade; and gray indicates unresolved participation status or no publicly identified state-diplomatic participation among coded cases. Pakistan's red anomaly code supersedes its underlying S:Y participation code for Figure 1. Countries outside the coded universe are neutral geographic background rather than substantive S:N cases. The map reflects only the publicly identifiable state-diplomatic subset and should not be read as a complete census of all foreign participation. No country-specific absence or downgrade case had been publicly resolved sufficiently for blue coding as of the analytical cutoff.

Sources: Author's country-level coding based on Iranian Foreign Ministry and IRNA reporting, supplemented by country-specific official government releases and international reporting. See References and Appendix A.

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Attendance alone, however, is insufficient. The more revealing signal is the difference between expected and actual participation.

Table 1. Patterns of Funeral Participation

| Participation Pattern | Interpretation | Illustrative Cases |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Confirmed → Appeared | Stable willingness to bear the public cost of attendance | China and Russia, which sent senior representatives while avoiding maximum-level exposure |
| Confirmed → Absent | Security concerns, diplomatic pressure, domestic cost, or strategic recalculation | Unnamed states described in reporting as having withdrawn under alleged U.S. pressure |
| Confirmed → Downgraded | Relationship preservation with reduced political exposure | Unnamed governments reportedly seeking lower-level representation, including reliance on diplomats already based in Tehran |
| Expected → Expanded | Broader access seeking, strategic signaling, or greater-than-anticipated commitment | Pakistan, whose participation extended across political, military, and internal-security institutions |

Note: The categories are analytical rather than definitive. Because the funeral unfolded across multiple stages and locations, absence from one ceremony does not necessarily constitute non-attendance. Reports that some governments withdrew, downgraded representation, or proposed locally based diplomatic substitutes had not been independently corroborated as of the analytical cutoff (Tasnim News Agency, 2026).

Sources: Author's analysis based on official participation reporting and publicly available reporting on alleged participation changes and external pressure. See References.

Absence does not necessarily indicate political distance, and expanded participation does not necessarily indicate closer alignment. Their meaning depends on how actual participation departed from prior expectation and under what political conditions that change occurred.

Reports further allege that Washington pressured governments to stay away, leading some to withdraw or reduce representation, while Tehran reportedly rejected lower-level diplomatic substitutes. The alleged campaign originated in Iranian media reporting, but no independent corroboration had been identified as of the analytical cutoff (Tasnim News Agency, 2026).

If such pressure shaped participation, the observed attendance pattern was not simply a passive reflection of preferences but may itself have been contested. An empty chair may reflect external pressure rather than voluntary distance; expanded participation may reveal strategic autonomy rather than alignment with Iran.

The broader response extended beyond formal diplomacy. **Figure 2** shows that clerical and religious responses appeared across one geographic network, while comparison between state-diplomatic and wider responses produced a second pattern: state-wider response divergence (IRNA, 2026a, 2026d).

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


Figure 2. Religious Authority and State-Wider Response Divergence

Publicly identified religious-authority responses and state-wider response divergence in reactions to Khamenei’s death and funeral ceremonies, as of July 6, 2026, 12:00 ET.

Note: In the left panel, red indicates publicly identified clerical or religious-institutional response, while gray indicates no such response publicly identified in the available reporting. In the right panel, red indicates publicly identified wider religious, movement, civic, cultural, political-social, or popular response without publicly identified state-diplomatic participation; blue indicates publicly identified state-diplomatic participation without a publicly identified wider response; purple indicates both state-diplomatic participation and a wider response; and gray indicates unresolved state participation status or neither category publicly identified among coded cases. S:N means that no state-diplomatic participation was publicly identified in the reviewed reporting by the cutoff; it does not mean verified state absence or non-participation. Iran is treated as a domestic reference case rather than as part of the foreign state-wider response comparison. Countries outside the coded universe are neutral geographic background. Color meanings are map-specific and should not be carried across figures. The maps reflect publicly identified locations and do not measure the intensity of support or degree of political alignment.

Sources: Author’s country-level coding based on Iranian Foreign Ministry and IRNA reporting, related official coverage, and publicly identified religious, civic, movement, cultural, and popular responses. See References and Appendix A.

Comparing the two panels reveals the central point: state diplomacy, religious authority, and wider response do not coincide.

A government may remain cautious while religious or social actors respond. A state may participate officially without a publicly identified wider response. In other cases, both state and non-state responses appear together. Strong mourning, however, should not be read automatically as political alignment or acceptance of Iran’s political model (Reuters, 2026a).

The funeral is therefore best read not as a list of allies and non-allies, but as a field in which route, participation, absence, rank, religious response, wider response, and external pressure reveal different forms of relationship and constraint.

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3. From Wartime Coercion to the Emerging Order

Military de-escalation has not ended competition over the war's political meaning (Wu, 2026a, 2026d).

Iran has strong incentives to present Khamenei's funeral as evidence of regime survival, leadership continuity, international recognition, and resistance to isolation. Washington, if reports of a pressure campaign are accurate, may seek to prevent Iran from converting survival and negotiated de-escalation into diplomatic prestige.

The funeral therefore marks a shift from battlefield coercion toward post-conflict legitimacy competition. It also reveals the structure of the emerging Middle East–Eurasia order.

The system is not dividing cleanly into blocs. Partial alignment is becoming normal, as states maintain overlapping relationships with the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and regional corridor systems.

Strategic autonomy is increasingly visible through diplomatic risk. The willingness to bear political cost in maintaining a relationship may reveal more than formal declarations of independence.

Iran's relevance, meanwhile, derives increasingly from network position rather than conventional great-power status. Geography, chokepoints, logistics, religion, energy, mediation, and cross-system connectivity make Iran difficult to exclude even for states that do not align with it (Wu, 2026b, 2026c).

Religion also remains an autonomous geopolitical force, with institutions, networks, legitimacy, and cross-border audiences that cannot be reduced to state policy.

The funeral therefore reveals not a new Iranian-led bloc, but an order increasingly defined by partial alignment, strategic connectivity, and contested autonomy (Wu, 2026b, 2026c).

Many states are not aligning with Iran. They are signaling that Iran remains a node they cannot afford to ignore.

4. Policy Implications

4.1 For the United States

Washington should avoid interpreting funeral participation as evidence of a consolidated anti-American coalition.

Participating states include strategic partners of Iran, mediators, bridge nodes, corridor actors, hedgers, and governments maintaining channels to post-ceasefire Iran. Treating them all as hostile risks hardening flexible relationships into more rigid opposition.

If the reported pressure campaign occurred, Washington should also consider whether treating ceremonial diplomacy as a test of strategic alignment could strengthen the strategic-autonomy behavior it seeks to limit.

4.2 For Iran

High turnout should not be mistaken for durable alignment. Many participants seek relations with Tehran without accepting Iranian leadership, military obligations, ideological commitments, or unconditional support. Iran's post-conflict influence will depend less on declaring symbolic victory than on preserving the networks that sustain its relevance.

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4.3 For Gulf States

For many Gulf states, the likely strategy remains hedging rather than realignment. Iran remains consequential. The United States remains essential. Israel retains independent escalation capacity. Hormuz remains a critical node. These conditions favor multidirectional risk management.

4.4 For Europe

European governments should pay greater attention to the growing linkage between Middle Eastern and Eurasian systems, particularly north–south corridors, Caspian logistics, energy, sanctions adaptation, and access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

5. Limitations

This brief is an interim assessment based on information available through July 6, 2026, 12:00 ET. The funeral sequence remained incomplete and was scheduled to continue through burial in Mashhad on July 9; later ceremonies may therefore alter assessments of participation and absence (Reuters, 2026c, 2026d).

The analysis distinguishes verified facts, reported expectations, and unverified claims. The alleged U.S. pressure campaign remained uncorroborated as of the analytical cutoff (Tasnim News Agency, 2026).

The maps reflect publicly identifiable evidence rather than exhaustive participation, response intensity, or political alignment. State–wider response divergence is relational, not causal: it does not establish government–society opposition, and S:N does not establish verified state absence.

Uneven reporting may also produce apparent gaps. The framework therefore identifies observable departures from expectation and the structural pressures they may suggest, rather than definitive motives.

Conclusion

Khamenei’s funeral reveals not a bloc, but a network of overlapping political, religious, and strategic relationships across the Middle East and Eurasia.

The most important signals lie in the difference between expectation and reality. Withdrawals may reflect limited commitment or external pressure; unexpected or expanded participation may reveal strategic autonomy, changing calculations, or a refusal to be excluded from the emerging order.

If reports of a U.S. pressure campaign prove even partly accurate, the funeral is doing more than reflecting that order. The struggle over who could come, who would come, who chose to bear the political cost of coming, and—if the pressure reports are accurate—who was discouraged or prevented from coming is part of shaping it.

This is a geopolitical roll call—not of allies, but of relationships, pressures, and limits.

What it revealed was not a new bloc, but a new map.

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Appendix A. Country-Level Coding Sources

A.1 Coding Framework

Analytical cutoff: July 6, 2026, 12:00 ET.

This appendix provides the auditable country-level coding underlying Figure 1 and 2. The unit of analysis is the country or territory associated with a publicly identified participant, delegation, institution, movement, or response.

The master table includes cases for which at least one relevant participation, response, anomaly, or unresolved-participation signal was identified. Countries outside the table are shown only as neutral geographic background and are not assigned substantive N codes.

a. State-Diplomatic Participation (S)

- **Y** = publicly identified government, parliamentary, military, or officially designated representative;
- **P** = participation identified, but representative status or level unresolved;
- **N** = no state-diplomatic participation identified in the reviewed reporting; this does not establish verified absence or non-participation;
- — = not applicable.

A country is coded **Y** only when the representative's official status is identified. Infographic-only participation with unresolved status is coded **P**.

b. Religious Authority (R)

- **Y** = publicly identified cleric, religious scholar, institution, or religious-political institution;
- **N** = no such response identified.

c. Wider Response (W)

- **Y** = publicly identified religious, movement, civic, cultural, antiwar, political-social, or popular response;
- **N** = no such response identified.
- **W** is broader than **R**; therefore, **W:Y** does not require **R:Y**.

A.2 Figure Coding Rules

a. Figure 1: State-Diplomatic Participation

- Green = S:Y
- Red = unexpected or expanded participation
- Blue = country-specific absence or downgrade
- Gray = S:P or S:N

No named absence or downgrade case was sufficiently resolved for blue coding by the cutoff. Pakistan is coded red for expanded participation; where red anomaly coding overlaps with S:Y, red takes precedence.

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b. Figure 2A: Religious Authority

- Red = R:Y
- Gray = R:N

Iran is included because this figure measures religious-authority response, not foreign diplomatic participation.

c. Figure 2B: State–Wider Response Divergence

- Purple = S:Y + W:Y
- Blue = S:Y + W:N
- Red = S:N + W:Y
- Gray = S:P, or neither category identified
- Domestic reference = Iran

Countries coded S:P remain gray because unresolved state status is insufficient to establish a confirmed state–wider response difference. Iran is shown separately as a domestic reference.

A.3 Interpretation Rules

The coding is **relational, not causal**.

Red does not demonstrate government–society opposition; it indicates wider response without publicly identified state-diplomatic participation.

Blue does not demonstrate absence of wider sympathy; it indicates state participation without publicly identified wider response.

Gray does not demonstrate non-participation or non-response; it may reflect unresolved status or incomplete evidence.

Accordingly, absence of public evidence is not treated as evidence of actual absence. Multiple appearances by the same country are counted once within each figure.

A.4 Evidence Tiers

- **Tier A** = named actor, delegation, institution, or official country-specific confirmation;
- **Tier B** = country identified in a grouped public report;
- **Tier C** = official participation infographic only, with representative level unresolved.

Where multiple sources exist, the highest supported tier is assigned.

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A.5 Country-Level Master Coding Table

Table 2. Country-Level Coding for State-Diplomatic Participation, Religious Authority, and Wider Response

| Country | ISO-3 | S | R | W | Figure 2B | Anomaly | Tier | Primary Evidence |
|----------------------------------|-------|---|---|---|--------------------|------------------------|------|--------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | AFG | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S2, S4, S5, S24 |
| Armenia | ARM | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Austria | AUT | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S6 |
| Azerbaijan | AZE | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Bangladesh | BGD | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S3, S15 |
| Belarus | BLR | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Bolivia | BOL | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S3, S4 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | BIH | N | Y | Y | Red | — | B | S3 |
| Bulgaria | BGR | Y | N | N | Blue | — | B | S4 |
| Burkina Faso | BFA | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2, S16 |
| China | CHN | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S3, S11 |
| Cuba | CUB | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | COD | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Denmark | DNK | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S6 |
| Ecuador | ECU | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S3, S4 |
| Egypt | EGY | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S17 |
| Georgia | GEO | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S18 |
| Hungary | HUN | N | Y | Y | Red | — | B | S3 |
| India | IND | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S3, S12 |
| Indonesia | IDN | N | Y | Y | Red | — | A | S4, S5 |
| Iran | IRN | — | Y | Y | Domestic reference | Domestic case | A | S7; domestic funeral reporting |
| Iraq | IRQ | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S3, S4, S19 |
| Italy | ITA | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S6 |
| Kazakhstan | KAZ | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2, S20 |
| Kyrgyzstan | KGZ | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Lebanon | LBN | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S3, S8, S21 |
| Malaysia | MYS | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Morocco | MAR | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S3, S4 |
| Myanmar | MMR | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S14 |
| Namibia | NAM | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2 |
| Netherlands | NLD | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S6 |
| Nicaragua | NIC | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2 |
| Oman | OMN | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Pakistan | PAK | Y | Y | Y | Purple | Expanded participation | A | S3, S9, S10 |

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Table 2. Country-Level Coding for State-Diplomatic Participation, Religious Authority, and Wider Response (Cont.)

| Country | ISO-3 | S | R | W | Figure 2B | Anomaly | Tier | Primary Evidence |
|-----------------------|-------|---|---|---|-----------|---------|------|------------------|
| Palestine | PSE | N | N | Y | Red | — | A | S8, S25 |
| Qatar | QAT | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1 |
| Republic of the Congo | COG | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S22 |
| Russia | RUS | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | A | S3, S23 |
| Saudi Arabia | SAU | P | N | N | Gray | — | C | S1, S8 |
| Serbia | SRB | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2 |
| Spain | ESP | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S3, S4 |
| Sri Lanka | LKA | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S13 |
| Syria | SYR | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S3, S4 |
| Tajikistan | TJK | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S19 |
| Thailand | THA | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2 |
| Türkiye | TUR | Y | Y | Y | Purple | — | B | S3, S8 |
| Turkmenistan | TKM | Y | N | N | Blue | — | B | S1, S19 |
| United Kingdom | GBR | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S6 |
| United States | USA | N | N | Y | Red | — | B | S7 |
| Uzbekistan | UZB | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S26 |
| Yemen | YEM | Y | N | N | Blue | — | A | S2, S8 |

A.6 Coding Summary

- **Figure 1: State-Diplomatic Participation**

S:Y = 25; S:P = 10; S:N = 15; expanded participation = Pakistan; named absence or downgrade cases = 0.

- **Figure 2A: Religious Authority**

R:Y = 13, including Iran as the domestic reference case.

- **Figure 2B: State–Wider Response Divergence**

Purple = 9; Blue = 16; Red = 15; Gray = 10; Iran = domestic reference.

A.7 Coding Source Directory

- **S1 — Country-Participation Infographic**

Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Countries participating in the ceremony paying respect to the body of the martyred Leader* [Infographic, Persian].

<https://www.irna.ir/news/86201042/>

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- **S2 — Iranian Foreign Ministry Delegation Archive**
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2026, July 3–5). *News archive: Foreign delegations attending ceremonies for the martyred Leader*. Accessed July 6, 2026. <https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsarchive/all>
- **S3 — Religious Leaders and Broader Foreign Participation**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Foreign dignitaries pay tribute to martyred Leader in Tehran*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199450/>
- **S4 — Broader Multi-Country Participation**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Iraqi president arrives in Tehran to attend funeral of Iran's martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199528/>
- **S5 — Indonesian and Afghan Scholars**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Global tributes: Scholars from Indonesia and Afghanistan honor Martyr Khamenei*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199558/>
- **S6 — European Civic and Movement Participation**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 2). *Italian anti-imperialist activists travel to Tehran to attend martyred Leader's funeral*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199184/>
- **S7 — Foreign Social Participation, Including the United States**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 6). *Foreigners visit Iran to attend memorial services for martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86202393/>
- **S8 — Arab Officials and Regional Movements**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Broad participation of Arab-country officials in farewell ceremony for martyred Leader* [Persian]. <https://www.irna.ir/news/86199824/>
- **S9 — Pakistan: Prime Minister and Army Chief**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Global tribute: Pakistani PM, Chief of Staff honor Martyr Ayatollah Khamenei*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199881/>
- **S10 — Pakistan: Interior Minister**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Pakistani Interior Minister arrives in Tehran to attend funeral of Iran's martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199468/>
- **S11 — China**
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2026, July 2). *He Wei to attend the funeral of Iran's late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei*. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wsrc/202607/t20260702_11956355.html
- **S12 — India**
Reuters. (2026, July 2). *India to send minister, governor to Ali Khamenei funeral*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/india-send-minister-governor-ali-khamenei-funeral-2026-07-02/>
- **S13 — Sri Lanka**
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Sri Lanka. (2026, July 5). *Sri Lankan parliamentary delegation attends funeral ceremonies for martyred Leader*. <https://srilanka.mfa.gov.ir/en/NewsView/790698>
- **S14 — Myanmar**
Ministry of Information of Myanmar. (n.d.). *Myanmar delegation attends funeral ceremony for Iran's late Supreme Leader*. <https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi%3Aeng/news/21468>

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- **S15 — Bangladesh**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Global tribute: Bangladesh's speaker pays homage to Martyr Ayatollah Khamenei*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200512/>
- **S16 — Burkina Faso**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Global tribute: Burkinabe FM pays respect to Iran's martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200300/>
- **S17 — Egypt**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Egyptian Senate president pays tribute to martyred Leader of the Revolution [Persian]*. <https://www.irna.ir/news/86199805/>
- **S18 — Georgia**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Global tribute: Georgian president pays tribute to martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200458/>
- **S19 — Iraq, Tajikistan, and Other Heads of State**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Heads of countries pay respect to the body of Iran's martyred Leader [Persian]*. <https://www.irna.ir/news/86199736/>
- **S20 — Kazakhstan**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Kazakhstan's foreign minister pays tribute to martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200239/>
- **S21 — Lebanon**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Global tribute: Lebanese defense minister pays tribute to Iran's martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200482/>
- **S22 — Republic of the Congo**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Global tribute: Congolese FM pays respect to Martyr Ayatollah Khamenei*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200554/>
- **S23 — Russia**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Global tribute: Russian presidential envoy pays tribute to Martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200375/>
- **S24 — Afghanistan**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 3). *Global tribute: Ahmad Massoud, Afghan delegation pay respects to Martyr Khamenei*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86199615/>
- **S25 — Palestine / Hamas**
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2026, July 5). *Head and members of Hamas political leadership council meet with Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. <https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/790688/>
- **S26 — Uzbekistan**
Islamic Republic News Agency. (2026, July 4). *Uzbek parliamentary speaker pays tribute to martyred Leader*. <https://en.irna.ir/news/86200356/>

Publication Note

This directory provides the source keys used in the country-level coding table. Coding reflects publicly identifiable evidence available by the analytical cutoff; absence from a category may reflect incomplete reporting rather than actual non-participation or non-response.