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Policy Brief

Ceasefire as Recovery Competition:

Rearmament, External Support, and Strategic Regeneration in a Non-Enforcement Environment

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Key Judgments

- Ceasefire redistributes time, not risk. It creates a competitive interval in which actors convert time into capability at unequal rates, shaping post-ceasefire confrontation.
- Post-ceasefire balance is determined by recovery performance, not prior attrition. The speed, efficiency, and scalability of reconstitution outweigh battlefield losses.
- Structural asymmetry in recovery is driven by external support and industrial depth. Iran relies on logistical inflows and political shielding, while the United States converts time into scalable capacity.
- Persistent disruption prevents stabilization. Israeli operations target logistics, recovery processes, and coordination across distributed networks.
- Ceasefire windows are structurally destabilizing. Simultaneous asymmetric recovery and network degradation prevent equilibrium and increase post-ceasefire escalation risk.

Executive Summary

Short-duration ceasefires in the current U.S.–Israel–Iran confrontation should not be interpreted as stabilizing mechanisms. Rather, they function as structured intervals for recovery, reconstitution, and strategic repositioning.

In the absence of enforceable guarantees, ceasefire shifts competition from direct confrontation toward relative recovery performance. Actors use this period to repair capabilities, restore operational integration, and prepare for subsequent phases of engagement.

Three distinct recovery pathways are evident:

- **Iran** relies on externally enabled recovery, supported by selective logistical inflows and political shielding.
- **The United States** emphasizes industrial regeneration and force sustainment, converting time into scalable, long-term capacity.
- **Israel** maintains continuous, low-intensity pressure to prevent adversaries from achieving full recovery equilibrium.

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At the same time, ceasefire redistributes operational pressure across proxy theatres, particularly in Lebanon and the Red Sea domain. Sustained operations against Hezbollah and Houthi forces enable continued pressure while limiting direct escalation risk.

Emerging reporting from March – April 2026 indicates disruptions in proxy coordination cycles and operational tempo, suggesting measurable degradation in cross-theater synchronization.

This dynamic introduces a second layer of competition: network disruption. Sustained pressure generates: reduced coordination speed across theaters, fragmentation of operational capabilities, and weakening of synchronized deterrence effects.

Taken together, recovery and disruption operate as dual competitive dynamics. Because these processes unfold at different speeds and through different mechanisms, they produce asynchronous recovery trajectories and uneven network degradation.

As a result, ceasefire does not generate equilibrium; it reconfigures the balance of power through interaction effects between capability restoration and network disruption, shaping conditions for renewed competition.

Why This Matters

Short-duration ceasefires are likely to recur in conflicts lacking enforceable guarantees. Misinterpreting these intervals as stabilizing mechanisms risks systematic underestimation of post-ceasefire escalation dynamics. Effective policy requires shifting from compliance-based monitoring toward capability evolution tracking and network-level analysis.

Conceptual Framework

Ceasefire under non-enforcement conditions can be understood as a **Time–Recovery Competition Framework**, in which three interacting dynamics structure outcomes:

- **Ceasefire as Competitive Interval:** Ceasefire redistributes operational tempo and creates a bounded window in which actors compete to convert time (a strategically contested resource) into capability.
- **Asynchronous Recovery Dynamics:** Recovery unfolds unevenly across actors due to differences in industrial capacity, external support, and operational constraints.
- **Degradation of Networked Deterrence:** Sustained pressure reduces coordination and coherence within distributed deterrence networks.

Mechanism Integration

These dynamics interact through two coupled processes:

- **Capability Restoration** (recovery trajectory);
- **Network Disruption** (deterrence degradation trajectory).

Their interaction produces systemic instability rather than equilibrium, as illustrated in **Figure 1.**



Figure 1. Time–Recovery Competition Framework

This framework provides a transferable analytical model for interpreting ceasefire as a competitive phase defined by time conversion, asymmetric recovery, and network disruption.

1. Reframing Ceasefire: From Pause to Competitive Interval

Ceasefire is commonly understood as a mechanism to reduce violence and create space for negotiation. Under conditions of non-enforcement, however, this assumption does not hold.

In the current conflict environment, three structural constraints undermine the stabilizing function of ceasefire:

- **No external actor can credibly enforce compliance**, limiting the effectiveness of formal agreements.
- **Violations are difficult to attribute and punish in real time**, reducing the cost of non-compliance.
- **Operational systems remain active**, even during nominal pauses, preserving underlying conflict capacity.

Under these conditions, ceasefire is better understood not as a stabilizing arrangement, but as a competitive interval.

Its functional effects are threefold:

- **Redistribution of operational tempo**, allowing actors to shift from active engagement to preparation.
- **Partial recovery of degraded capabilities**, including logistics, command integration, and force readiness.
- **Reconfiguration of future engagement conditions**, shaping the strategic environment ahead of renewed confrontation.

The central question is therefore not whether actors comply with ceasefire, but how effectively they convert time into capability.

This shift from cessation to competition requires a framework capable of capturing both recovery dynamics and the evolution of distributed deterrence structures.



Figure 2. Dual Competition Under Ceasefire: Divergent Recovery Trajectories and Degradation of Networked Deterrence

This figure conceptualizes ceasefire as a dual-competition system. While state actors engage in asymmetric recovery processes, shaped by external support, industrial capacity, and operational constraints, simultaneous pressure on proxy actors contributes to a gradual degradation of networked deterrence.

The interaction of these dynamics produces asynchronous capability restoration and declining network coherence, preventing equilibrium and continuously reshaping the balance of power in advance of renewed confrontation.

2. Divergent Recovery Pathways

Ceasefire does not produce a uniform recovery process. Instead, it reveals structurally distinct pathways through which actors convert time into capability. These pathways are shaped by differences in industrial capacity, external support, and strategic objectives, resulting in asymmetric recovery trajectories.

2.1 Iran: Externally Enabled Recovery

Iran’s recovery model prioritizes speed and external enablement over scale and sustainability.

Iran’s recovery capacity is constrained by limited domestic industrial scalability and restricted access to global supply chains. As a result, its recovery process is externally enabled and selectively optimized.

Key mechanisms include:

- Targeted external inputs, including logistical support and material inflows prioritized for high-value systems;
- Time-sensitive transport channels, particularly air and ground corridors designed to accelerate partial capability restoration;
- Dual-use civilian and humanitarian flows, which may indirectly support operational sustainment;
- Political shielding, especially from non-Western actors, reducing external pressure and enabling continued resource inflow.

This model prioritizes rapid, partial recovery rather than comprehensive system restoration. The objective is to maintain a minimum viable level of operational capability sufficient for deterrence, signaling, and continued pressure.

However, this approach remains structurally constrained. Its effectiveness depends on the continuity of external inputs and is vulnerable to interdiction, disruption, and political fluctuation.

2.2 United States: Industrial and Force Regeneration

The U.S. recovery model prioritizes scalable, long-term regeneration over rapid battlefield restoration.

The United States follows a fundamentally different recovery pathway based on industrial depth and global logistical integration.

Its recovery process is driven by:

- Scalable expansion of precision munition production, enabling sustained replenishment;
- Repair, rotation, and redeployment of naval and air assets, restoring operational readiness ;
- Personnel regeneration, including reinforcement and rotation cycles;
- Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and targeting integration, improving operational effectiveness.

This model converts time into long-term capacity expansion rather than immediate battlefield recovery. It reflects a system capable of absorbing initial losses and regenerating strength through industrial scaling.

However, this approach is inherently time-intensive, characterized by a temporal lag between production expansion and battlefield effect. Its strategic objective is not rapid reversal, but the restoration and amplification of sustained operational capability.

2.3 Israel: Continuous Disruption Strategy

Israel’s approach prioritizes disruption over recovery, focusing on delaying adversary regeneration.

Israel’s strategy diverges from both recovery-oriented models. Rather than maximizing its own recovery, it focuses on denying effective recovery to adversaries.

This approach operates through:

- Targeted and time-sensitive strikes aimed at disrupting recovery nodes and high-value assets;
- Persistent surveillance and rapid-response capabilities enabling continuous pressure;
- Selective deployment of drones and stand-off systems, maintaining operational reach without full escalation;
- Sustained low-intensity operations designed to impose friction across multiple domains.

This strategy transforms ceasefire into an environment of continuous disruption, increasing the cost, uncertainty, and duration of adversary recovery processes.

As a result, Israel seeks not to maximize its own recovery curve, but to flatten or delay the recovery trajectories of its opponents, particularly within the broader networked deterrence structure.

3. Asynchronous Recovery and System Instability

The interaction of these divergent recovery pathways produces a system characterized by asynchronous recovery across actors. Rather than converging toward a common equilibrium, recovery unfolds at different speeds, scales, and levels of integration.

As illustrated in Figure 1, this asymmetry reflects three distinct dynamics:

- **Iran prioritizes speed and flexibility**, enabling rapid but partial capability restoration under external constraints.
- **The United States prioritizes scale and sustainability**, generating long-term capacity through industrial expansion, albeit with delayed initial effects.
- **Israel prioritizes disruption**, actively constraining the recovery processes of others rather than maximizing its own recovery trajectory.

These differences prevent synchronization across recovery curves. Instead, they produce a system in which:

- **Capability restoration remains uneven**, with no actor achieving full-spectrum recovery within the same timeframe.
- **Relative advantages shift over time**, as early gains by one actor may be offset by later capacity expansion or external disruption.
- **Uncertainty accumulates toward the end of the ceasefire window**, particularly regarding the balance of capabilities at re-engagement.

The combined effect is a system in which stability cannot emerge endogenously. Even in the absence of overt escalation, the lack of synchronized recovery and the presence of continuous disruption prevent the formation of a stable equilibrium.

In this context, instability is not the result of failure, but a structural outcome of asynchronous recovery processes interacting under conditions of competition.

4. Escalation Risk Under Asynchronous Recovery

Asynchronous recovery increases the probability of miscalculation by generating divergent assessments of readiness, capability, and relative advantage.

Under such conditions, actors operate with incomplete and temporally uneven information, leading to misaligned perceptions of both their own preparedness and that of their adversaries. This creates a condition in which escalation may be triggered not by deliberate intent, but by misperception of relative readiness.

As a result, escalation risk is not solely a function of capability, but of perception under asymmetry, where decisions to act are shaped less by objective balance than by subjective interpretation of shifting recovery trajectories.

5. Time as a Strategic Resource

Ceasefire transforms time from a neutral backdrop into a contested strategic resource. Under conditions of non-enforcement, time is not merely experienced. It is actively converted into capability.

Time functions not simply as duration, but as a convertible strategic asset with unequal exchange rates across actors. The same temporal interval yields different outcomes depending on each actor’s capacity to transform time into:

- **Operational readiness**, including force integration and deployment preparation;
- **Logistical throughput**, enabling replenishment and sustainment;
- **Strategic positioning**, shaping the conditions under which subsequent engagement will occur.

These differences reinforce the dynamics identified in preceding sections. As recovery pathways diverge and unfold asynchronously, time becomes the medium through which relative advantage is produced rather than merely revealed.

In this context, negotiation under non-enforcement conditions can be understood as a form of time arbitrage. Actors do not simply delay confrontation; they seek to exploit temporal asymmetries by converting time into capability more efficiently than their opponents.

Time therefore exhibits three interrelated strategic properties:

- It can be **differentially accumulated**, depending on access to external support and internal capacity.
- It can be **unevenly converted into capability**, reflecting structural constraints and recovery models.
- It is **actively contested**, as actors attempt to disrupt or delay the conversion processes of others.

The strategic implication is clear: the actor that more effectively converts time into capability does not merely prepare for the next phase of conflict. It preconfigures the balance of power before engagement resumes.

6. Proxy Theatre Dynamics: Disruption of Networked Deterrence

An important but often underexamined dimension of ceasefire dynamics is the redistribution of military pressure across proxy theatres. Under conditions of reduced direct confrontation with Iran, operational focus may shift toward non-state and semi-state actors aligned with Tehran, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi forces in Yemen.

This reallocation of pressure serves two strategic purposes.

First, it enables the maintenance of continuous operational pressure while limiting the risk of direct escalation with Iran.

Second, it targets the structural foundation of Iran's deterrence model, which depends on a distributed network of geographically dispersed actors capable of coordinated action.

Within the ceasefire window, sustained pressure on these proxy actors introduces a second layer of competition—one centered on the integrity and coherence of networked deterrence.

This dynamic generates three interrelated systemic effects:

- **Coordination Lag**: Disruption of communication and command pathways reduces the speed, reliability, and simultaneity of joint responses across theaters.
- **Capability Fragmentation**: Proxy actors increasingly operate in isolation, diminishing their effectiveness as components of an integrated system.
- **Deterrence Dilution**: The credibility of networked deterrence declines as synchronization weakens and collective signaling becomes less coherent.

These effects do not eliminate proxy capabilities. Rather, they alter the structure of those capabilities, transforming a synchronized deterrence network into a set of loosely coupled and temporally misaligned actors.

Over time, this erosion of network coherence constrains Iran's ability to convert distributed proxy activity into unified strategic leverage, particularly during the immediate post-ceasefire phase.

In this sense, ceasefire does not only enable competitive recovery; it also facilitates the selective degradation of adversary network integration, reinforcing systemic instability even in the absence of direct escalation.

7. Policy Implications

7.1 Shift from Compliance Monitoring to Capability Tracking

Traditional ceasefire monitoring frameworks prioritize the detection of violations. Under conditions of non-enforcement, however, this approach is insufficient, as formal compliance provides limited insight into underlying shifts in power.

Policy attention should instead focus on capability tracking, including:

- **Logistical flows and supply corridors**, which determine the speed and sustainability of recovery;
- **Production and replenishment rates**, particularly for precision munitions and other high-value systems;
- **Deployment and redeployment patterns**, indicating changes in operational readiness and force posture.

This shift reflects a broader transition from event-based monitoring to process-based assessment, in which the central question is not whether ceasefire holds, but how capabilities evolve during it.

7.2 Prioritize Recovery Denial

In a competitive recovery environment, strategies aimed at limiting adversary regeneration may be more effective than those focused solely on deterrence.

Policy efforts should prioritize recovery denial, particularly through:

- **Disruption of logistics networks**, constraining material inflows and sustainment capacity;
- **Targeting of repair, integration, and reconstitution nodes**, delaying the restoration of operational capability;
- **Interference with intelligence, communication, and coordination systems**, reducing recovery efficiency and increasing uncertainty.

Such measures do not eliminate adversary capability. Instead, they increase the time, cost, and uncertainty associated with converting resources into operational readiness, thereby altering the trajectory of recovery.

7.3 Recognize Dual-Use Channels

Humanitarian and civilian channels may function as dual-use logistical pathways in high-intensity conflict environments. While these channels serve legitimate purposes, they can also indirectly support operational sustainment.

This creates a persistent policy dilemma: restrictive measures risk humanitarian consequences and political backlash, while permissive approaches may facilitate adversary recovery and prolong conflict dynamics.

Effective responses therefore require granular monitoring, differentiation of use, and calibrated intervention, rather than blanket restriction. The objective is not to eliminate dual-use flows, but to manage their conversion into military capability.

7.4 Avoid Overestimating Stabilization Effects

Short-duration ceasefires should not be assumed to reduce long-term risk. Under conditions of asymmetric recovery and ongoing network disruption, they may instead increase the likelihood of renewed escalation.

By enabling uneven capability restoration and allowing actors to reposition strategically, ceasefire can intensify competition in the post-ceasefire phase rather than resolve it.

Policy frameworks should therefore treat ceasefire not as a stabilizing endpoint, but as a transitional phase requiring active management of both recovery dynamics and network-level disruption effects.

Conclusion

Ceasefire in the current conflict environment should not be understood as a transition to peace, but as a shift toward competitive recovery under constraint.

In this setting, the decisive variable is no longer the scale of damage inflicted during active hostilities, but the relative capacity of actors to restore, reconstitute, and reposition their forces within a limited and contested time frame. Time, in this context, functions not as a pause in conflict, but as a medium through which capability is accumulated, converted, and contested.

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As long as recovery processes remain uneven, externally conditioned, and subject to disruption, ceasefire cannot produce durable stability. Instead, it operates as a transitional phase in which the conditions of the next round of confrontation are actively constructed.

At the same time, ceasefire dynamics extend beyond recovery alone. Sustained pressure across proxy theatres contributes to the selective degradation of network coherence, reducing the effectiveness of coordinated deterrence without eliminating underlying capabilities. This introduces a second axis of competition centered on the integrity of distributed deterrence systems.

Taken together, these dynamics define ceasefire as a dual process of asymmetric recovery and network disruption—one that continuously reshapes both capability distribution and deterrence structure. Under such conditions, ceasefire is best understood not as a stabilizing endpoint, but as a reconfiguration interval within an ongoing competitive system.

Final Statement

Ceasefire under non-enforcement does not suspend conflict—it restructures it into a dual competition over recovery and network coherence.