Published 2025-10-13 | Version v1.0
Working PaperOpenPublished

Gray-Zone Maritime Rights-Protection Strategy

Asymmetric Costs and Sustainable Presence, A Case Study of the China–Philippines Dispute over Scarborough Shoal

Description

This working paper develops a Cost–Distance–Frequency (CDF) framework for evaluating gray-zone maritime rights-protection operations under asymmetric geography. Using the China–Philippines dispute over Scarborough Shoal as a case study, it models cost per effective hour of presence, risk expectation, sustainability thresholds, and manned–unmanned substitution conditions to assess how sustained presence, operational tempo, and cost compression shape long-term strategic symmetry.

Abstract

Gray-zone maritime rights-protection operations increasingly hinge on sustained presence rather than episodic tactical encounters, particularly under conditions of geographic asymmetry between near-shore and far-shore actors. This paper introduces a Cost–Distance–Frequency (CDF) analytical framework that models cost per effective hour of presence, integrates risk expectation and policy-defined sustainability thresholds, and derives closed-form conditions for manned–unmanned substitution in long-duration deployments. Applying the framework to the China–Philippines dispute over Scarborough Shoal, the analysis demonstrates how near-shore advantages rooted in proximity and sortie frequency can be structurally offset over time through far-shore cost compression, prepositioning, and unmanned force integration. The study highlights the dynamic interaction among cost accumulation, operational tempo, and incident risk in shaping strategic symmetry under gray-zone conditions. By linking operational design to long-term fiscal and institutional endurance, the CDF framework offers a potentially generalizable analytical tool for informing force-posture decisions in contested maritime environments.

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Keywords

  • Gray-zone maritime strategy
  • Maritime rights-protection
  • Cost–Distance–Frequency framework
  • CDF model
  • Scarborough Shoal
  • China–Philippines dispute
  • South China Sea
  • Sustained presence
  • Asymmetric costs
  • Operational sustainability
  • Manned–unmanned substitution
  • Unmanned surface vehicles
  • Maritime law enforcement
  • Effective presence
  • Risk expectation

Subjects

  • International Relations
  • Maritime Security
  • South China Sea Studies
  • Gray-Zone Conflict
  • Strategic Studies
  • Operational Sustainability Modeling

Recommended citation

Wu, Shaoyuan. (2025). Gray-Zone Maritime Rights-Protection Strategy: Asymmetric Costs and Sustainable Presence, A Case Study of the China–Philippines Dispute over Scarborough Shoal. Global AI Governance and Policy Research Center, EPINOVA LLC. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18095271. DOI: To be assigned after Crossref membership approval.

APA citation

Wu, S. (2025). Gray-Zone Maritime Rights-Protection Strategy: Asymmetric Costs and Sustainable Presence, A Case Study of the China–Philippines Dispute over Scarborough Shoal. Global AI Governance and Policy Research Center, EPINOVA LLC. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18095271. DOI: To be assigned after Crossref membership approval.

Alternate identifiers

SchemeIdentifierDescription
File nameGray-Zone Maritime Rights-Protection Strategy.pdfSource PDF file name
Publication date2025-10-13Date shown in the PDF title page
DOI10.5281/zenodo.18095271Zenodo DOI from the earliest ORCID-derived metadata record
ORCID put-code201033348ORCID Public API put-code from the earliest metadata record
Repository folderhttps://github.com/EPINOVALLC/EPINOVA-Research/tree/main/Working%20Paper/F/2025/2025-10-13GitHub repository folder from the earliest metadata record

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