Published 2026-07-08 | Version v1.0
Policy BriefOpenPublished

Is the U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict Entering Phase III?

Residual Target Depletion and the Shift from Asset Destruction to Functional Disruption

Description

This policy brief examines whether the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict is entering a third phase and introduces Residual Target Depletion (RTD) as a framework for understanding how prolonged conflict changes the strategic value of targets. It argues that Phase III has not yet been conclusively established, but renewed attacks on commercial shipping, new U.S. strikes inside Iran, Iranian retaliation against U.S. military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait, and the erosion of the interim accord place the conflict in a credible Phase II–III transition zone. The brief proposes that, as previously exposed fixed assets are damaged, hardened, dispersed, substituted, or repeatedly attacked, the marginal strategic return from further disruption declines and strategic competition shifts from asset destruction toward the disruption of the functions that sustain residual operational continuity.

Abstract

The latest escalation along the U.S.–Iran axis raises a central question: is the broader U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict entering Phase III? The evidence remains inconclusive. Renewed attacks on commercial shipping, new U.S. strikes inside Iran, Iranian retaliatory strikes targeting U.S. military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait, and the erosion of the interim accord place the conflict in a credible Phase II–III transition zone. A durable phase transition, however, requires a structural change in how the conflict operates, not merely a temporary increase in strike intensity. If Phase III is emerging, it begins from a fundamentally altered target environment. Earlier phases have already destroyed, disabled, evacuated, hardened, dispersed, or repeatedly exposed many visible high-value assets. This brief introduces Residual Target Depletion (RTD): the progressive decline in the marginal strategic return from further disruption of previously exposed fixed targets. RTD does not mean target exhaustion; it means diminishing returns as assets are damaged, disabled, hardened, dispersed, substituted, or repeatedly exposed. As RTD increases, conflict shifts from asset destruction toward functional disruption. A genuine Phase III would therefore be defined less by larger strikes or a longer target list than by a sustained change in target logic: from attacking visible assets and constraining recovery toward disrupting the distributed functions that sustain residual operational continuity.

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Keywords

  • U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict
  • Phase III
  • Phase II–III transition
  • Residual Target Depletion
  • RTD
  • functional disruption
  • asset destruction
  • recovery denial
  • target logic
  • marginal strategic return
  • functional centrality
  • distributed operations
  • networked conflict
  • operational continuity
  • residual functionality
  • target migration
  • dispersion
  • functional substitution
  • maritime security
  • Strait of Hormuz
  • ISR
  • early warning
  • distributed basing
  • aviation sustainment
  • logistics continuity
  • network resilience
  • interdependent networks
  • U.S.–Iran escalation
  • strategic competition
  • EPINOVA

Subjects

  • International security
  • Strategic studies
  • Military operations
  • Networked conflict
  • Middle East security
  • Maritime security
  • Military logistics
  • Operational resilience
  • Infrastructure networks
  • Conflict escalation
  • Systems analysis
  • Defense policy
  • Public policy

Recommended citation

Wu, Shaoyuan (2026), Is the U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict Entering Phase III? Residual Target Depletion and the Shift from Asset Destruction to Functional Disruption, Policy Brief No. EPINOVA–2026–PB–62, Global AI Governance and Policy Research Center, EPINOVA LLC. https://doi.org/10.67037/epinova.pb.2026.062

APA citation

Wu, S. (2026). Is the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict entering Phase III? Residual target depletion and the shift from asset destruction to functional disruption. EPINOVA Policy Brief Series, EPINOVA-PB-2026-062. Global AI Governance and Policy Research Center, EPINOVA LLC. https://doi.org/10.67037/epinova.pb.2026.062.

Alternate identifiers

SchemeIdentifierDescription
URLhttps://epinova.org/policy-brief-1Official EPINOVA publication page
EPINOVA policy brief numberEPINOVA–2026–PB–62Policy brief number printed in the PDF
File nameIs the U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict Entering Phase III Residual Target Depletion and the Shift from Asset Destruction to Functional Disruption.pdfSource PDF file name
Short titleIs the U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict Entering Phase III?Short form of the policy brief title
Analytical conceptResidual Target Depletion (RTD)The progressive decline in the marginal strategic return from further disruption of previously exposed fixed targets as they are destroyed, disabled, evacuated, hardened, dispersed, substituted, or repeatedly attacked
Analytical conceptFunctional disruptionA late-phase target logic focused on disrupting the distributed functions that sustain residual operational continuity rather than only destroying visible fixed assets
Conflict-phase conceptPhase II–III transition zoneA provisional analytical condition in which renewed direct escalation may be moving toward a structurally distinct conflict phase but has not yet conclusively crossed the threshold

Related works

RelationIdentifierTypeDescription
IsPartOfhttps://epinova.org/policy-brief-1Publication seriesEPINOVA Policy Brief Series
IsSupplementedByhttps://github.com/EPINOVALLC/EPINOVA-ResearchRepositorySupplementary repository and structural archive
ReferencesAlberts, Garstka, and Stein (2000). Network centric warfareBookReferenced for network-centric operations, connectivity, information flows, and operational architecture
ReferencesBuldyrev et al. (2010). Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networksJournal articleReferenced for cascading effects and interdependent-network failure dynamics
ReferencesHu et al. (2016). Recovery of infrastructure networks after localised attacksJournal articleReferenced for infrastructure recovery sequences and restoration of network functionality

References

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  2. Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E., & Havlin, S. (2010). Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. Nature, 464(7291), 1025–1028. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08932
  3. Hu, F., Yeung, C. H., Yang, S., Wang, W., & Zeng, A. (2016). Recovery of infrastructure networks after localised attacks. Scientific Reports, 6, Article 24522. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep24522
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